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Policymakers are increasingly focused on lowering rates of student absenteeism. Recent reports found that approxi-mately 15% of students are “chronically absent” each 
year, which is typically defined as missing 10% or more of the 
instructional days in a school year (Jordan et al., 2018). Increased 
attention to absences is exemplified by recent reforms in the 
Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which requires states to 
include chronic absenteeism rates as part of their report cards to 
the federal government. Additionally, as part of the ESSA reform 
that requires states to include in their accountability plan at least 
one indicator of school quality or student success that does not 
involve state test scores or graduation rates (commonly referred 
to as the “fifth indicator”1), 36 states have included an indicator 
related to student attendance (Jordan & Miller, 2017).
Undoubtedly, the federal requirement to track and report 
these outcomes explains the choice by many states to focus on 
attendance, whereas other potential indicators (e.g., school cli-
mate or students’ social-emotional skills) require capacity and 
resources to design new measures and implement them across 
the state. Nevertheless, a large body of evidence highlights that 
reducing absenteeism is a worthy target for school improvement 
efforts. For instance, several prior studies established a credible 
causal link between student absenteeism and lower academic 
achievement (Aucejo & Romano, 2016; Gershenson et al., 
2017; Goodman, 2014; Gottfried, 2009, 2010; Liu et al., 2019). 
Further, Liu et al. (2019) showed that beyond lowering test 
scores, high school absences decrease the probability of on-time 
high school graduation and immediate college enrollment. 
Additional correlational evidence suggests that absences may 
lead to increased alcohol/drug use (Hallfors et al., 2002; Henry 
& Thornberry, 2010) and lower likelihood of future employ-
ment (Cattan et al., 2017). Student attendance is also a common 
proxy measure for character skills (e.g., conscientiousness), 
which are valued by employers in the labor market (Heckman & 
Kautz, 2013).
Increased attention to student absenteeism has spurred explo-
ration of the extent to which schools affect this outcome, though 
existing work largely focused on teachers. For instance, recent 
research demonstrated that teachers have substantial effects on 
students’ non–test score outcomes, including absences (Backes 
& Hansen, 2018; Gershenson, 2016; Jackson, 2018; Liu & 
Loeb, 2019).2 These effects are comparable to, if not larger than, 
teachers’ effects on test scores, and teachers who excel at raising 
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test scores are not the same teachers who excel at decreasing 
absences, on average.
Drawing on 11 years of statewide data from Tennessee, this 
study contributes to the literature by examining whether princi-
pals affect student absences using a value-added (VA) frame-
work. A large body of research linked effective leadership to 
school performance, including higher student test scores (Branch 
et al., 2012; Chiang et al., 2016; Coelli & Green, 2012; Dhuey 
& Smith, 2014, 2018; Grissom et al., 2015), better school cli-
mate (Burkhauser, 2017; Kraft et al., 2016; Sebastian & 
Allensworth, 2012), and lower teacher turnover (Boyd et al., 
2011; Grissom & Bartanen, 2019b; Ladd, 2011). To date, how-
ever, no studies have estimated principal effects on student 
absenteeism. To help fill this gap, I answer the following research 
questions:
Research Question 1: What effect do principals have on stu-
dent absences?
Research Question 2: How does the magnitude of principal 
effects on absences vary by school context?
Research Question 3: To what extent are estimates of princi-
pals’ effects on absences correlated with other measures of 
principal effectiveness, including principal effects on 
achievement and rubric-based ratings from supervisors?
Isolating the effects of individual principals on student 
absences presents a formidable empirical challenge. Consistent 
with approaches used in prior work to estimate principal effects 
on student achievement, I employ VA models with both princi-
pal and school fixed effects to isolate the impact of principal 
quality from other factors—such as the neighborhood or the 
quality of the school building—that might affect student absen-
teeism but that the principal cannot control. However, drawing 
from the teacher effects literature, I also implement a modified 
version of the drift-adjusted VA estimator proposed by Chetty 
et al. (2014). This approach, which has not been applied in the 
principal effects literature, relaxes the assumption that principal 
quality is fixed over time.
The next section presents a framework connecting principal 
quality and student absenteeism. I then discuss the challenges of 
estimating principal effects on student outcomes as well as the 
approaches pursued in prior studies. Next, I describe the data 
and methods used to produce estimates of principals’ effects on 
student absences, including the implementation of the drift-
adjusted VA estimator. I then present the results. The conclud-
ing section discusses implications for policy and research, 
limitations, and avenues for future work.
The Role of Principals in Improving Student 
Attendance
While this study is the first to explicitly consider how principals 
affect attendance, a large literature explores how principals affect 
student achievement. A broadly accepted conclusion of this litera-
ture is that principal effects on student achievement are indirect 
(e.g., Grissom & Loeb, 2011; Hallinger & Heck, 1998; Sebastian 
& Allensworth, 2012; Witziers et al., 2003), whereby principals 
influence school-level factors that in turn affect student learning. In 
particular, the quality of instruction students receive is the critical 
in-school factor for their learning. Principals affect this instruction 
directly through hiring and retention of effective teachers, provid-
ing feedback and coaching for existing teachers, and building a 
strong school climate (Sebastian & Allensworth, 2012). With 
respect to student attendance, I argue that while many of these 
indirect pathways are important, principals’ leadership behaviors 
may also directly influence whether students come to school.
Clearly, teachers remain an indirect channel—prior evidence 
demonstrated that teachers have large effects on student absences 
(Gershenson, 2016; Jackson, 2018; Liu & Loeb, 2019). As pri-
mary human capital managers for schools, principals’ influence 
over hiring and retention affects the quality of the school’s teach-
ing staff (Cohen-Vogel, 2011; Grissom & Bartanen, 2019b; 
Jacob, 2011; Rockoff et al., 2012). Further, the recent studies of 
teacher effects on non–test score outcomes underscored the mul-
tidimensional nature of teacher quality. In short, we know that 
teachers have differing strengths and that those who contribute 
most to improving attendance are systematically not those who 
produce the largest test score gains. Principals, then, can build 
and maintain a staff of teachers who excel at decreasing student 
absenteeism. They can also develop staff capacity to engage in 
effective attendance practices through professional development 
and coaching of teachers (Attendance Works, 2017).
Beyond influencing the quality of instruction students 
receive, principals may also directly affect student absences 
through a number of pathways.3 One channel is communication 
with families. Principals are uniquely positioned to both person-
ally contact parents and coordinate a school-wide policy that 
increases communication from school staff. Parents of highly 
truant students often believe that their child’s attendance records 
are average compared to the child’s peers (Rogers et al., 2017; 
Rogers & Feller, 2018). Relatedly, studies found that informing 
parents about their child’s attendance or the importance of 
attendance can help improve school attendance rates (e.g., 
Epstein & Sheldon, 2002; Robinson et al., 2018; Roderick et al., 
1997; Rogers et al., 2017; Smythe-Leistico & Page, 2018). For 
example, Robinson et al. (2018) demonstrated in a randomized 
field experiment that mail-based communication with parents 
that provided personalized information about their child’s 
absence record and reinforced the importance of regular atten-
dance in grades K–5 lowered chronic absenteeism rates. Even 
communication with parents not explicitly focused on atten-
dance may be beneficial. Kraft and Rogers (2015) found that in 
a high school credit recovery program, a randomly assigned 
intervention delivering weekly individualized text messages to 
parents about their child’s schoolwork decreased the probability 
of class absence. Similarly, Bergman (2015) found experimental 
evidence that providing parents with biweekly information 
about their child’s missed assignment and grades lowered 
absences during the semester.
Principals can also affect student absences through their 
control over school policies and programs. While empirical evi-
dence in this area is lacking, one focus of states/districts and 
advocacy groups (e.g., Attendance Works) is to encourage prin-
cipals to adopt an explicit strategy for reducing absenteeism. As 
an example, the Connecticut State Department of Education 
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maintains a detailed website4 that describes the state’s vision for 
reducing chronic absenteeism and provides strategies that prin-
cipals can implement in their schools. Attendance Works and 
the National Association of Elementary School Principals pub-
lished similar guides for school leaders. Beyond outreach to 
parents and families, common recommendations include 
implementing or leveraging existing data systems to target sup-
ports to students at risk of missing school or establishing pro-
cedures for mandatory interventions at a certain absence 
threshold. Principals can also integrate added supports for 
improving attendance into school policies that target strug-
gling students, such as response to intervention or positive 
behavioral interventions and supports (Attendance Works, 
n.d.). Finally, principals’ efforts may also include building rela-
tionships that engage local stakeholders, both to draw on out-
side expertise and increase community awareness of chronic 
absenteeism as an important issue (Childs & Grooms, 2018).
To summarize, there are both direct and indirect channels 
through which principals may affect student absenteeism. While 
some of these indirect channels are likely the same channels 
through which principals affect test scores (e.g., human capital 
management, instructional leadership), principals’ frequent 
interactions with students and families and their unique position 
to direct school policy are plausibly more direct ways of reducing 
student absences. While this study cannot identify the relative 
importance of these pathways, it serves to test the overall magni-
tude of principals’ contributions to student attendance, which 
helps to lay the groundwork for future research.
Estimating Principal Effects
To examine the extent to which principal quality matters for stu-
dent attendance, I draw on value-added modeling. This frame-
work allows me to estimate an “effect” on a given outcome for 
each individual principal. The distribution of these VA estimates 
indicates the extent to which variation in principal quality leads 
to changes in student outcomes. This approach to identifying 
principal quality is conceptually distinct from a larger body of 
research that estimated the relationship between principal leader-
ship behaviors and student outcomes (see Liebowitz & Porter, 
2019, for a review of this research). Here, “quality” is identified 
not by direct measurement of principals’ behaviors or traits but 
rather the systematic over- or underperformance of their stu-
dents, adjusting for factors that the principal cannot control.
A handful of prior studies used VA modeling to estimate prin-
cipal effects on student test scores.5 Four studies used large state or 
district administrative data sets to estimate models with principal 
and school fixed effects (Branch et al., 2012; Chiang et al., 2016; 
Dhuey & Smith, 2018; Grissom et al., 2015). The magnitude of 
principals’ effects ranges between 0.05 and 0.20 SD—in other 
words, a 1 SD increase in principal quality increases student test 
scores by 0.05 to 0.20 SD. Two studies using data from British 
Columbia—Coelli and Green (2012) and Dhuey and Smith 
(2014)—found even larger effects, though they used estimation 
approaches that hinder direct comparison with other studies.
In contrast to the teacher VA literature, little work investi-
gated the validity and reliability of principal VA estimates. The 
central validity issue is whether the model effectively isolates the 
“true” contribution of a principal. Neither students nor princi-
pals are randomly assigned to schools, which heightens concern 
that principals are rewarded or punished for factors beyond their 
control. In particular, prior work highlighted the importance of 
separating principal effectiveness from school factors such as 
location or financial resources and demonstrated empirically 
that school value-added is a poor measure of principal effective-
ness (Chiang et al., 2016; Grissom et al., 2015).6
The challenge of accounting for school factors is that  researchers 
typically do not observe them or have access to good proxy 
 measures. The solution in the literature is to estimate models with 
principal and school fixed effects. Intuitively, these models make 
comparisons among principals who worked in the same school, 
such that persistent school factors cannot explain differences in 
student outcomes. This approach, for instance, avoids punishing 
principals who work in schools that struggle to attract high- quality 
teachers because of their location. However, including school fixed 
effects does not eliminate bias from time-varying school factors 
that the principal cannot control, such as planned facilities 
upgrades or an increase in community violence. These models also 
have a considerable practical limitation, which is that most 
 principals can only be compared to small set of other principals.
A second validity concern is the timing of effects. Despite 
conceptual support for a more dynamic model of principal 
effects, prior work most often restricted principal quality to be 
fixed. However, principals’ contributions to student outcomes 
may grow over time (e.g., Coelli & Green, 2012; Grissom et al., 
2015). For instance, a new-to-school principal inherits many of 
the teachers hired under the old principal. To the extent that 
human capital management is an important avenue through 
which principals affect student outcomes (Branch et al., 2012; 
Grissom & Bartanen, 2019b; Jacob, 2011), it may take several 
years for the effect of a high-quality principal to manifest itself 
through improved student outcomes. Additionally, principals 
likely improve as they gain experience (Bartanen, 2019; Clark 
et al., 2009; Grissom et al., 2018), such that producing a single 
VA estimate for a principal’s career masks substantial heteroge-
neity in their effectiveness over time.
Setting aside the validity issues outlined previously, VA esti-
mates contain both true differences in effectiveness among prin-
cipals and measurement error. For teacher VA models, reliability 
is a nontrivial concern due in part to the small number of stu-
dents per teacher. Principal VA benefits from larger sample sizes 
because all students in the school contribute to estimation and 
studies typically pool data across years to produce a single “career 
VA” estimate. Similar to the approach often implemented in the 
teacher VA literature, prior studies accounted for measurement 
error in principal VA using shrinkage estimators (e.g., empirical 
Bayes), though unsurprisingly, these adjustments tend to be 
small in magnitude (Branch et al., 2012; Chiang et al., 2016; 
Grissom et al., 2015).
An overarching theme of the principal effects literature is that 
while principal VA has largely followed the methodological 
approach of teacher VA, there are unique challenges to successfully 
isolating the causal effect of principals on student outcomes. Prior 
work focused, in particular, on addressing the threat of bias from 
school factors that the principal cannot control. These studies 
directly inform my empirical strategy, but I also aim to address 
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issues that have yet to receive substantial attention, including the 
time-varying nature of principal effectiveness.
Data
This study analyzes administrative data from Tennessee covering 
the 2006–2007 through 2016–2017 school years, provided by 
the Tennessee Department of Education via the Tennessee 
Education Research Alliance. The data contain information 
about students’ enrollment and attendance, including enroll-
ment dates at each school, dates of absences, and a flag for 
whether the absence was excused or unexcused; the criteria for 
these designations are determined at the district level. Additionally, 
I accessed student demographics and the full test score history, 
which includes end-of-year achievement scores in math and read-
ing for Grades 3 through 8 and end-of-course (EOC) exams for 
high school students.7 I also accessed staff files that allowed me to 
identify school principals in each year. In total, I observed roughly 
3,800 unique principals working in 1,700 schools from 2006–
2007 through 2016–2017.
Operationalizing Student Attendance
In Tennessee, a student who misses more than 50% of the school 
day is recorded as absent. Appendix Figure A1, available on the 
journal website, shows the distribution of absence rates by grade 
level for the 2016–2017 school year. Nearly 40% of students 
were absent more than 5% of instructional days, with 13% 
reaching the threshold for chronic absenteeism (10% absent rate 
or greater). However, chronic absenteeism was substantially 
higher in high schools. For example, 26% of 12th-grade students 
were chronically absent, compared to only 13% of 8th-grade 
students and 15% of 9th-grade students. Kindergarten students 
also had high absenteeism rates relative to their older elementary 
school peers.
I examined four measures of absenteeism. First, I computed 
each student’s total absence rate, which is the number of school 
days absent divided by the total number of enrolled school days. 
Additionally, I computed excused and unexcused absence rates 
by dividing excused/unexcused absences by days enrolled.8 
Differentiating between excused and unexcused absences is poten-
tially informative given that prior work found that unexcused 
absences were more detrimental to student learning than excused 
absences (Gershenson et al., 2017; Gottfried, 2009). Further, the 
efficacy of principals’ efforts could vary between absence types. 
Finally, I also created a binary indicator for chronic absenteeism, 
using the standard threshold of 10% absence rate or above (Jordan 
et al., 2018). As shown in Appendix Table A3, available on the 
journal website, the mean absence rate is 5.5%, with a roughly 
equal split between excused and unexcused absences.
Methods
Approach 1: Principal and School Fixed Effects
I begin with the standard approach in the principal effects litera-
ture, which includes both principal and school effects. 
Specifically, I estimated via ordinary least squares the following 
model:
     
Y Y X Sisjt i t it st gt j s isjt= + + + + + +−α β γ pi δ θ, 1   (1)
where i, s, j, and t index students, schools, principals, and years, 
respectively; Y, a student’s absence or achievement outcome, is a 
function of their prior outcomes (though not necessarily the 
most recent prior year, as I discuss in the following); a vector of 
student characteristics, X; a vector of school characteristics, S; 
grade-by-year fixed effects, π; principal fixed effects, δ; school 
fixed effects, θ; and a random error term, ϵ. Achievement models 
use students’ end-of-year exams for elementary and middle 
schools and EOC exams for high schools, such that I can esti-
mate both achievement and absence VA across all three school 
levels. For absence models, the prior-year outcomes include non-
parametric functions of a student’s prior absence rates and 
suspensions.9
Given the changing distribution of student absenteeism 
across grades, I interacted prior absence rates with a student’s 
prior grade to allow for the possibility that the relationship 
between past and current attendance differs across grade levels. 
For achievement models, I controlled for cubic functions of 
prior test scores in math and reading as well as prior-year atten-
dance rates, each interacted with a student’s prior grade.10 
Student characteristics include gender, race/ethnicity, free/
reduced-price lunch eligibility, special education classification, 
gifted classification, whether the student is repeating the grade, 
and whether the student has any enrollment spells in another 
school in the current school year. School characteristics are 
school-level averages of the student characteristics.
The principal fixed effect, δj, is the parameter of interest; it 
captures the extent to which the actual absence rates of students 
of principal j are higher or lower than what would be predicted 
by students’ prior absences and achievement, individual charac-
teristics, grade, the school year, and school. The model accounts 
for school quality in two ways: time-varying averages of student 
demographics and a school fixed effect, θs. Including school 
fixed effects accounts for any time-invariant unobserved school-
level factors. Conceptually, this model identifies principal qual-
ity using within-school variation in student outcomes under 
different principals. The movement of principals across schools 
creates connected networks of principals, where a principal’s esti-
mated effect, δj, represents their effectiveness relative to other 
principals in the same network (Burkhauser, 2017; Chiang et al., 
2016; Mansfield, 2015).
In practice, principal sorting patterns and high rates of attri-
tion lead to a large number of disconnected networks that often 
contain only a few principals. The primary limitation of small 
networks is that principal VA estimates only reflect effectiveness 
relative to those in the same network rather than across the entire 
state. Additionally, I could not estimate VA for 17% of princi-
pals because they were the sole principal of a school across the 
data period.11 Removing school fixed effects from the model 
allows for a global ranking of principals but greatly heightens the 
possibility of bias from unobserved school heterogeneity. 
Appendix Table A1, available on the journal website, shows the 
distribution of networks formed by Tennessee principals based 
on the analytic sample for estimating absence VA (Appendix 
Table A2, available on the journal website, shows the networks 
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for achievement VA). In sum, the analytic sample included 
roughly 3,100 principals and 4.3 million student-by-year obser-
vations. Descriptive statistics for the analytic sample are shown 
in Appendix Tables A3 and A4 available on the journal website.
It is important to note that because most students in year t 
had the same principal in year t − 1, including prior-year out-
comes is a violation of strict exogeneity and potentially biases the 
principal effect estimates. The degree of this bias likely depends 
on the nature of how principals affect student outcomes. 
Controlling for the prior-year outcome is effectively investigat-
ing whether a principal causes continued improvement in the 
outcome, as opposed to a one-time increase. For student achieve-
ment, examining continued improvement may be perfectly rea-
sonable. In the case of attendance, however, the inclusion of 
prior-year outcomes may be more problematic. If, for instance, a 
new principal implements a program that reduces absenteeism, 
we might expect to observe a bump in attendance in that year. If 
absence rates are stable in the following year, we would like to 
still conclude that the principal was effective at reducing absen-
teeism. However, if we control for prior-year absences, we will 
conclude that the principal was not effective at reducing absen-
teeism in the second year.
One potential solution is to remove the prior-year outcome 
from the model entirely. However, this heightens the risk of bias 
from nonrandom student sorting between schools, particularly if 
students are responding to changes in school quality that are not 
captured by school fixed effects or demographic controls. I pro-
pose a different solution, which is to include in the model the 
student’s most recent prior outcome from their previous school. 
For example, consider an eighth-grade student who has been in 
their current school since sixth grade but attended a different 
school in fifth grade. Instead of controlling for their seventh-
grade absences, which are endogenous to both the current prin-
cipal and school effect (assuming that the principal is not in their 
first year at the school), I controlled for her fifth-grade absences, 
which are not affected by the current school or principal. While 
this approach allowed me to avoid the endogeneity concern, it 
excluded a nontrivial number of students. Specifically, I could 
only estimate this model for students that have prior-year out-
comes in a different school, which systematically drops students 
in lower grades and students in the earlier years of the data (see 
Appendix Table A4 available on the journal website). Fixed 
effects estimates for elementary school principals thus leverage 
fewer students (see Appendix Table A5 available on the journal 
website) and contain more noise.
Approach 2: Drift-Adjusted Value-Added
A shortcoming of the simple two-way fixed effects approach is 
that it is inflexible with respect to changes in principal effective-
ness over time. My preferred model allowed for changes in perfor-
mance by producing an effect estimate for each principal-by-year 
observation. Specifically, I used a modified version of the estima-
tor developed by Chetty et al. (2014) for teacher VA. The estima-
tor had three steps to produce VA for principal j in school s in 
year t: (a) Residualize students’ absences (or achievement) on a 
vector of observable characteristics (the same student- and school-
level controls from Equation 1), (b) estimate the best linear 
predictor of mean absence residuals for all students in school s 
with principal j in year t based on mean absence residuals for 
principal j in prior or future years, and (c) use the coefficients of 
the best linear predictor to predict principal VA in year t. In 
essence, this approach begins by estimating the two-way fixed 
effects model from Approach 1 but then leverages variation in 
principal-by-year average residuals to produce a time-varying 
measure of principal quality.12 Appendix B, available on the jour-
nal website, contains details on the construction of principal VA 
using the drift-adjusted estimator. I also performed a validation 
check proposed by Chetty et al. that tests for forecast bias using 
students’ twice-lagged outcomes (which are omitted from the VA 
model). Across both absence and achievement outcomes, I found 
minimal evidence of bias, supporting the claim that the VA esti-
mates are valid measures of principal effectiveness.
There are three important differences between Approaches 1 
and 2. First, the VA estimates in Approach 2 (drift-adjusted VA) 
are leave-year-out measures, meaning that principal-school esti-
mates in year t do not incorporate student outcomes from year t. 
Second, whereas the principal estimates from the fixed effects 
models in Approach 1 include school-level shocks and student 
errors (which is the motivation for the empirical Bayes approach), 
Approach 2 inherently produces shrunken estimates. To the 
extent that student residuals in a given year are higher or lower 
due to transitory shocks and/or student-level measurement error 
(as opposed to the true principal effect), this variation is uncor-
related (in expectation) with residuals in past or future years. 
Using these past and future residuals to predict contemporane-
ous residuals, then, will produce an estimate that is shrunken 
toward the sample mean. Further, this shrinkage also accounts 
for the number of students that contribute to estimating each 
principal’s effect, such that the adjustment to the estimates for 
principals in smaller schools will tend to be larger to reflect the 
fact these estimates are less precise. Finally, the drift-adjusted 
approach allows for the possibility that principal quality changes 
over time rather than estimating an average effect across the 
principal’s career.
Results
Do Principals Affect Student Absences?
Figure 1 plots the distribution of principal VA estimates from 
Approaches 1 and 2—the fixed effects and drift-adjusted 
 models—for absence and achievement outcomes, with the 
 corresponding summary statistics shown in Table 1. The number 
of principals for whom I could estimate achievement VA was 
smaller because some schools (e.g., grades K–2 only) did not 
have end-of-year or EOC exams. The standard deviations of the 
estimates represent how much principals vary in their effects on 
student outcomes; a larger standard deviation indicates that 
principal quality is more consequential for the particular out-
come. The units for absence VA are rates (i.e., on a 0%–100% 
scale), whereas chronic absenteeism VA is expressed in terms of 
probability. Finally, the units for math and reading achievement 
are student-level standard deviations.
Studies of principal and teacher effects typically interpret 
magnitude according the standard deviation of the VA estimates. 
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FIGURE 1. Distribution of principal value-added estimates.
Note. (a) Fixed effects. (b) Drift-adjusted.
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This approach makes sense if the estimates are normally distrib-
uted. However, the distribution of principal VA estimates is non-
normal (Figure 1). Specifically, the presence of a small number of 
outliers inflates the standard deviation. To provide a more mean-
ingful interpretation of the magnitude of principal effects on 
student outcomes, I report the interquartile range (IQR): the 
difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles in the 
distribution.
I focus my discussion on the estimates from the drift-
adjusted approach. I found that principals have substantial 
effects on student attendance. The IQR of principal VA to 
absence rates is 0.8, meaning that replacing a principal at the 
25th percentile with one at the 75th percentile decreases the 
absence rate of all students in the school by 0.8 percentage 
points, on average. This decrease corresponds to 1.4 fewer 
instructional days missed on a 180-day calendar and 13% of a 
standard deviation in absence rates among students in the ana-
lytic sample. I also found that principals’ effects on attendance 
operate through both excused and unexcused absences, with 
only a slightly larger IQR for unexcused absence rates. Finally, I 
found that moving from the 25th to 75th percentile lowers the 
probability that a student will be chronically absent in the cur-
rent year by 4 percentage points, or roughly 30% of the base 
rate among Tennessee students.13
Consistent with prior studies, principals are also an impor-
tant input to student learning. The IQR of principal VA to math 
and reading achievement is 0.15 and 0.07 student-level SD, 
respectively. How do principal effects on absences and achieve-
ment compare in terms of magnitude? To provide a direct com-
parison, I reestimated absence VA using rates that are standardized 
within grade and year (the same process used for test scores). The 
distribution of these standardized VA estimates are shown in 
Appendix Table A6, available on the journal website. The IQR 
of principal VA for total absences, unexcused absences, and 
excused absences, respectively, is 0.11 SD, 0.12 SD, and 0.14 
SD. Thus, the impact of principal quality on student absences is 
similar in magnitude to the impact on achievement.
Does the Importance of Principal Quality for Student 
Absences Vary by School Context?
My second research question examined whether the magnitude 
of principal effects varied by three categories of school context: 
school level, school locale, and school poverty (as measured by 
the percentage of students who qualify for free/reduced-price 
lunch). Table 2 shows the IQR of the drift-adjusted VA estimates 
within each of the subgroups of these categories.
The IQR of principal effects on attendance rates is similar 
across school levels. For instance, the IQR for absence rate VA is 
0.9 percentage points among high school principals versus 0.8 
for elementary and middle school principals. However, I did 
find that magnitude of principal effects for achievement out-
comes is larger for elementary school principals.14 The IQR for 
math (reading) achievement among elementary school princi-
pals is 0.18 SD (0.09 SD), compared to 0.14 SD (0.06 SD) for 
middle and high school principals.
For school locale and poverty level, a clear pattern emerged: 
Principal effects in urban and high-poverty schools are larger 
across both absence and achievement outcomes. For instance, 
the IQR for absence rates among principals in urban schools is 
1.1 percentage points, compared to 0.8 and 0.7 in suburban and 
rural schools, respectively. This difference is explained more by 
unexcused absences, where the magnitude in urban schools (1.1 
percentage points) is roughly twice as large as suburban (0.6) 
and town/rural schools (0.6). I found similarly sized differences 
for student achievement in math and reading. The largest differ-
ences in the magnitudes of principal effects on absences are 
between high-poverty and low-poverty schools. The IQR for 
absence rates is twice as large in high-poverty schools (1.4 per-
centage points) than low-poverty schools (0.7 percentage points). 
Moreover, moving from the 25th to 75th percentiles in principal 
quality lowers the probability of chronic absenteeism by 6 per-
centage points in high-poverty schools.
In sum, I did find heterogeneity across school contexts in the 
magnitude of principal effects for both absences and achieve-
ment. Principal effects are largest in urban and high-poverty 
schools—a noteworthy finding given that these schools tend to 
have students with lower baseline attendance and achievement. 
Further, prior analysis of the leadership labor market in Tennessee 
founds that high-poverty and low-achieving schools are the most 
likely to be led by inexperienced and low-rated principals 
(Grissom et al., 2019). The findings here further underscore the 
importance of recruiting and retaining high-quality principals in 
disadvantaged schools. Finally, while the drivers of absenteeism 
may be quite different for younger versus older students, princi-
pals’ contributions to reducing absences are similar in magnitude 
across school levels. This could suggest that there is not a single 
pathway through which principals reduce absenteeism but 
rather, that high-quality principals at different school levels tai-
lor their efforts to address the factors that inhibit attendance for 
their specific student population.
Comparing Absence VA to Other Measures  
of Principal Quality
My final research question investigated whether principals who 
excel at decreasing student absenteeism can be identified using 
other measures of principal effectiveness. Specifically, I com-
pared principals’ absence VA to their achievement VA as well as 
high-stakes rubric-based observation scores from their supervi-
sors and low-stakes survey-based ratings from teachers in their 
school. Table 3 compares principals’ estimated VA to absence 
and achievement outcomes. A natural question is whether prin-
cipals who increase student achievement also improve atten-
dance. To answer this question, I computed Spearman rank 
correlations among the VA estimates. However, because the net-
works used to construct VA estimates for achievement and 
absences were different, I could not directly compare these esti-
mates. To provide an accurate comparison, I reestimated absence 
VA using the networks created for achievement VA. It is also 
important to note that because VA estimates contain measure-
ment error, correlations among these estimates are attenuated. 
However, applying disattenuation corrections similar to those 
used in prior studies of teacher VA (e.g., Kraft, 2019) yielded 
very similar results because the estimated reliability of principal 
VA estimates is high.15
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The first column of Table 3 compares principals’ drift-
adjusted VA across absence and achievement outcomes.16 
Comparing principals’ effects on absences to achievement scores, 
there are small positive correlations with math and reading VA 
for each model. For instance, the rank correlation between 
absence and math (reading) VA is 0.11 (0.12). In terms of 
excused versus unexcused absences, the link to achievement is 
slightly stronger for unexcused absence VA. Table 3 also shows a 
negative correlation between principal VA for excused and unex-
cused absences. This likely reflects heterogeneity across princi-
pals in terms of setting the criteria for classifying an absence as 
excused or unexcused. In substantive terms, these modest corre-
lations between absence and achievement VA demonstrate that 
principals who improve student attendance are not necessarily 
the same principals whose students have the greatest achieve-
ment growth. To the extent that student attendance is an 
important educational outcome even beyond its relationship 
with achievement, the results in Table 3 suggest that focusing 
exclusively on student achievement to identify principal quality 
will fail to capture the contributions of principals to improving 
students’ noncognitive or character skills, such as attendance.
Table 4 examines correlations between drift-adjusted princi-
pal VA estimates and principals’ rubric-based ratings from super-
visors17 and survey-based ratings from teachers.18 Specifically, I 
regressed standardized ratings on standardized principal VA and 
included fixed effects for each connected network used to con-
struct principal VA and fixed effects for district-by-year.
Columns 1 through 4 in Panel A in Table 4 show no correla-
tion between absence VA and supervisor ratings. In other words, 
these rubric-based ratings do not contain information about 
principals’ contributions to decreasing student absenteeism. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the results for achievement VA in math 
Table 1
Distribution of Principal Value-Added Estimates
N SD IQR Percentile of Estimates
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Fixed effects
 Absence rate 3,141 1.9 1.0 –1.8 –0.5 –0.0 0.5 1.6
 Unexcused absence rate 3,141 1.7 0.9 –1.4 –0.5 –0.0 0.4 1.3
 Excused absence rate 3,141 1.2 0.8 –1.2 –0.4 0.0 0.4 1.2
 Chronic absenteeism 3,141 0.09 0.05 –0.08 –0.03 0.00 0.02 0.08
 Math achievement 2,045 0.24 0.19 –0.23 –0.10 –0.00 0.09 0.23
 Reading achievement 2,058 0.13 0.10 –0.12 –0.05 –0.00 0.05 0.12
Drift-adjusted
 Absence rate 13,173 1.5 0.8 –1.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 1.2
 Unexcused absence rate 13,173 1.3 0.7 –1.1 –0.4 0.0 0.4 1.1
 Excused absence rate 13,173 0.9 0.6 –0.9 –0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8
 Chronic absenteeism 13,173 0.07 0.04 –0.06 –0.02 –0.00 0.02 0.06
 Math achievement 8,559 0.20 0.15 –0.18 –0.08 0.00 0.08 0.20
 Reading achievement 8,408 0.10 0.07 –0.09 –0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09
Note. Absence estimates are multiplied by –1 to facilitate comparison with achievement estimates. For absence rates, the scale is 0% to 100%. Chronic absenteeism is 
expressed as a probability on a 0 to 1 scale. Achievement outcomes are student-level standard deviation units. Sample sizes for fixed effects are at the principal level, 
whereas drift-adjusted are at the principal-by-year level. IQR = interquartile range, which is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution.
Table 2
Interquartile Range of Drift-Adjusted Value-Added Estimates by School Characteristics
School Level School Locale School Poverty
 Elementary Middle High Urban Suburb Rural Low Medium High
Absence rate 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.4
Unexcused absence rate 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.3
Excused absence rate 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9
Chronic absenteeism 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06
Math achievement 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.22
Reading achievement 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11
Note. Absence estimates are multiplied by –1 to facilitate comparison with achievement estimates. For absence rates, the scale is 0% to 100%. Chronic absenteeism is 
expressed as a probability on a 0 to 1 scale. Achievement outcomes are student-level standard deviation units. School poverty is categorized by the percentage of students 
in the school who qualify for free/reduced principal lunch: 0% to 30% (low), 30% to 70% (medium), 70% to 100% (high). For school locale, rural includes schools classified 
as “town” by National Center for Education Statistics.
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and reading. Here, the coefficients are positive and slightly larger 
in magnitude, though the relationship is only statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels for reading. Column 6, for instance, 
shows that a 1 SD increase in a principal’s supervisor rating is 
associated with a 0.10 SD increase in their reading VA. Panel B 
shows the results for teacher ratings. Again, the estimated coef-
ficients are all close to zero, and none are statistically significant 
at the 95% level. Overall, the results in Table 4 demonstrate that 
subjective ratings of performance from supervisors or teachers 
contain little to no information about principals’ contributions 
to improving student attendance or achievement.
Discussion and Conclusions
Student attendance is increasingly recognized as an important 
measure of school success, which has spurred research that exam-
ines the extent to which schools affect attendance outcomes. To 
date, studies almost exclusively focused on teachers, and we have 
convincing evidence that teachers play an important role in 
decreasing student absenteeism. However, no studies considered 
the effect of principals despite strong conceptual reasons to 
believe that principals can influence absences and prior work 
demonstrating that principal quality matters for student achieve-
ment. I begin to fill this gap by estimating value-added models 
that isolate the impact of individual principals on student 
absences. To my knowledge, this study is the first to extend the 
principal effects literature to a non–test score outcome.
My central finding is that principals have substantive effects 
on student absences. Moving from the 25th to 75th percentiles in 
principal quality lowers absence rates by 0.8 percentage points, 
which corresponds to 1.4 additional instructional days for each 
student in the school, on average. The magnitude of these impacts 
is roughly comparable to principal effects on test scores. Further, 
principals have even larger effects in high-poverty and urban 
schools, which also have the highest rates of chronic absenteeism. 
Similar to findings from studies that estimated teacher effects on 
absences, principals who decrease student absences are not neces-
sarily those who increase test scores. Modest correlations between 
principal VA to absence and achievement outcomes highlight the 
multidimensional nature of principal quality. In particular, this 
finding challenges the notion that effective school leadership is 
completely defined by a principal’s ability to drive achievement 
gains. While there need not be a tradeoff between test score and 
non–test score outcomes, this study demonstrates that there is 
still much to be learned about what constitutes principal quality 
and how to identify effective school leaders.
From a policy perspective, insofar as attendance is an  outcome 
worthy of attention, accountability systems designed around 
Table 3
Spearman Correlations Among Drift-Adjusted Value-Added Estimates
Absences Unexcused Absences Excused Absences Chronic Absenteeism Math Reading
Absence rate 1.00  
Unexcused absence rate 0.63 1.00  
Excused absence rate 0.46 –0.22 1.00  
Chronic absenteeism 0.91 0.58 0.42 1.00  
Math achievement 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.09 1.00  
Reading achievement 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.48 1.00
Note. Absence estimates are multiplied by –1 to facilitate comparison with achievement estimates.
Table 4
Do Supervisor or Teacher Ratings Identify High Value-Added Principals?
Absences
(1)
Unexcused Absences
(2)
Excused Absences
(3)
Chronic Absenteeism
(4)
Math
(5)
Reading
(6)
Panel A
 Supervisor rating 0.033
(0.035)
0.041
(0.037)
–0.013
(0.029)
0.036
(0.031)
0.062
(0.046)
0.099***
(0.036)
 N 7,104 7,104 7,104 7,104 4,281 4,113
Panel B
 Teacher rating 0.021
(0.032)
0.019
(0.034)
0.004
(0.022)
0.040*
(0.024)
0.032
(0.022)
–0.014
(0.023)
 N 6,656 6,656 6,656 6,656 4,028 3,846
Note. Each cell is a separate regression, where the independent variable is average standardized supervisor rating (Panel A) or average standardized teacher rating (Panel 
B) and the dependent variable is a principal’s standardized VA score from the drift-adjusted approach for the outcome listed in the column header. All models include 
network and district-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by principal and network shown in parentheses. Absence value-added estimates are multiplied by –1 to 
facilitate comparison with achievement estimates. Sample sizes refer to principal-by-year observations beginning in 2011–2012, which is the first year that supervisor and 
teacher ratings are available.
*p < .10. ***p < .01.
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identifying principals who increase test scores will fail to identify 
principals who are improving attendance—and by extension, 
principals who improve other non–test score outcomes. Indeed, 
I found that principals’ rubric-based scores from supervisors, 
which comprise half of their summative evaluation rating under 
Tennessee’s high-stakes evaluation system, are not predictive of 
their contributions to decreasing student absenteeism and are 
only marginally predictive of principals’ impacts on student 
achievement. Given prior research demonstrating a strong rela-
tionship between supervisor ratings and principal mobility deci-
sions (Grissom & Bartanen, 2019a), the findings here suggest 
that districts may be making placement and retention decisions 
on the basis of a performance measure that has little connection 
to student outcomes.
This study is particularly timely given the inclusion of an 
attendance-related outcome as a measure of school performance 
in the majority of state accountability plans under the Every 
Student Succeeds Act. From the perspective of policymakers and 
district leaders, my results suggest that intervening with princi-
pals could be an effective means to address high rates of chronic 
absenteeism. As states and districts invest additional resources 
into improving the quality of school leadership, they should con-
sider the multidimensionality of principal effectiveness because 
the skills and practices that promote test score growth may be 
different than those that promote regular attendance.
That said, while I document variation in principals’ impacts 
on student absences, an important limitation of this study is that 
I am unable to identify the specific pathways through which 
principals influence attendance. Research connecting principals 
to student outcomes largely focused on test scores, such that the 
results here highlight the need to expand our thinking about 
how principals influence other outcomes, especially given 
increased policy emphasis on understanding and measuring the 
extent to which schools affect students’ noncognitive or social-
emotional skills. Future work should aim to identify how princi-
pals influence absences or other non–test score outcomes. For 
instance, how do principals leverage attendance data to identify 
and support students who are likely to miss school? How do 
effective principals engage with parents to promote strong atten-
dance habits? Better understanding these mechanisms could pro-
vide useful guidance about specific ways to target development 
opportunities for school leaders to help them lower absenteeism 
rates.
Additionally, while the methodological choice to use both 
principal and school fixed effects is important to credibly isolate 
the contributions of principals from school-level factors they 
cannot control, it limits the practical use (e.g., for accountability 
purposes) of these estimates. Even with the population of 
Tennessee principals across a decade, the majority of principals 
can only be compared within a small network of connected 
schools. This practical limitation is not faced by teacher VA 
models, which typically do not include these school effects and 
thus can produce a statewide ranking of teachers.19 Given the 
continued emphasis on directly connecting educator evaluation 
to student outcomes, reconciling the empirical challenges of 
principal VA and the practical needs of accountability systems is 
another important avenue for future research. More generally, 
while I attempt to draw out and address some of the gaps in our 
understanding of the properties of principal VA estimates, this 
area remains relatively underdeveloped and worthy of additional 
attention.
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 1The four other indicators are reading and math proficiency, high 
school graduation rate, English language proficiency, and student test 
score growth.
 2Beyond attendance, recent work linked teacher quality to high 
school graduation (Jackson, 2018; Liu & Loeb, 2019), students’ self-
reported attitudes such as motivation and self-efficacy (Blazar & Kraft, 
2017), and complex cognitive skills (e.g., problem solving) and social-
emotional competencies (Kraft, 2019).
 3Here, I use direct to refer to the efforts of principals that are not 
mostly or completely mediated by teachers or other school staff.
 4https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Publications/Reducing-Chronic- 
Absence-in-Connecticuts-Schools
 5For sake of simplicity, I also include in this group studies that 
directly estimated the variance of principal effects but did not estimate 
effects for individual principals.
 6If school factors outside the principal’s control are unimportant 
for student learning, using school value-added (VA) to measure prin-
cipal performance should produce the same ranking of principals as a 
model that separates principal and school effects. Both Grissom et al. 
(2015) and Chiang et al. (2016) showed that these approaches produce 
very different results.
 7End-of-course (EOC) exam requirements vary by year. In 2016–
2017, students took exams for Algebra I, geometry, Algebra II, English 
I, English II, and English III.
 8Alternative ways of operationalizing absences (e.g., logarithmic 
transformations, using the raw count data) were very highly correlated 
with my preferred principal effect estimates.
 9Specifically, I constructed categorical variables based on the 
student’s prior-year absence rates. For total absences, the categories are 
as follows: 0%, 1% to 5%, 6% to 10%, 11% to 15%, 16% to 20%, 
21% to 30%, 31% to 40%, 41% to 50%, 51% to 60%, 61% to 70%, 
71% to 80%, 81% to 90%, 91% to 100%. For unexcused and excused 
absences, the categories are: 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6% to 9%, 
10% to 19%, 20% to 29%, 30% to 39%, 40% to 49%, 50% to 100%. 
For suspensions, I created separate variables for the number of in-school 
an out-of-school suspensions the student received: 0, 1, 2, 3+.
10Not controlling for prior-year test scores allowed me to use 
students from all grades rather than the subset who were in Grades 
3 through 8 in the prior year or who took an EOC exam. Including 
these additional grades increased the network sizes in the two-way fixed 
effects model and also allowed me to produce estimates for roughly 100 
additional principals.
11More specifically, I imposed a restriction that all principals in 
the analytic sample must have at least 50 student-by-year observations. 
This restriction resulted in dropping a handful of principals who were 
in networks with one other principal. Since dropping the principal with 
fewer than 50 observations changed the network to a single principal, 
the other principal in the network is effectively dropped from the analy-
sis because they no longer have any comparison set.
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12One major difference between my approach and the approached 
used by Chetty et al. (2014) is that I included both school and principal 
fixed effects in the residualization step. Specifically, Chetty et al. residu-
alized test scores on observable characteristics using within-teacher vari-
ation (i.e., with teacher fixed effects). When computing the residuals, 
they added back in the teacher fixed effects. I performed a similar pro-
cess with principal effects, with the exception that the residualization 
included both principal and school fixed effects. When computing the 
residuals, I added back in the principal fixed effects but not the school 
fixed effects. As explained previously, this approach accounts for the 
possibility that the vector of observable characteristics does not fully 
control for school-level heterogeneity that would otherwise be attrib-
uted to principal effectiveness. However, as with Approach 1, employ-
ing both principal and school fixed effects means that the VA estimates 
are only comparable for principals within the same connected network.
13One concern is that there are ceiling effects with absences, such 
that principals in schools with many students with perfect or near-
perfect attendance effectively cannot have high value-added because 
there is no room to improve. While 8% of Tennessee students have 
zero absences and 23% have fewer than three absences, there are rela-
tively few schools that have absence rates close to zero (see Appendix 
Figure A2, available on the journal website), which suggests that ceiling 
effects do not substantially affect principals’ VA estimates. Prior work 
investigating ceiling effects in teacher VA also found that even under 
relatively severe test score ceiling, teachers’ VA estimates were negligibly 
influenced (Koedel & Betts, 2009). As an additional check, I reesti-
mated the absence VA models under three sample restrictions: dropping 
students with zero absences, dropping students in the bottom 10% of 
the distribution of absence rates, and dropping students in the bottom 
25% of the distribution of absence rates. Appendix Table A8, available 
on the journal website, shows that the distributions of VA estimates 
using these restrictions were highly similar to the distribution using the 
full sample. Additionally, Appendix Table A9, available on the journal 
website, shows that the rank correlations of principal absence VA were 
consistently high across these sample restrictions. In sum, these findings 
suggest that while ceiling effects are present, they likely do not substan-
tially affect principals’ VA estimates.
14Larger achievement impacts on elementary school students was 
documented for teacher VA (e.g., Backes & Hansen, 2018; Chetty 
et al., 2014).
15To explore the plausible magnitude of attenuation in correlations 
among principal VA estimates, I followed the approach proposed by 
Kraft (2019), which computed disattenuated Pearson correlations using 
the Spearman (1904) adjustment. Specifically, the adjustment multi-
plies the raw correlation by the inverse of the square root of the product 
of the reliability of the two measures. This disattenuation correction, 
for instance, increased the Pearson correlation between absence VA and 
math (reading) VA from 0.13 (0.15) to 0.15 (0.17). Full results are 
available on request.
16Appendix Table A7, available on the journal website, shows the 
correlations for the fixed effects.
17These ratings are rubric-based scores that principals receive 
as part of Tennessee’s statewide educator evaluation system (TEAM) 
implemented in 2011–2012. Fifty percent of the TEAM evaluation 
for principals comes from ratings of principal performance on a rubric 
derived from the Tennessee Instructional Leadership Standards. These 
ratings are based on formal observations conducted by the principal’s 
supervisor. Prior work showed that principals’ ratings across indicators 
were highly interrelated and could be reduced to a single underlying 
performance score using factor analysis (Grissom et al., 2018). In this 
analysis, I used principals’ average yearly observation scores—the exact 
measure used by the state to calculate summative evaluation ratings. 
Using the average observation score instead of the factor score described 
in Grissom et al. (2018) allowed me to include principals in districts 
that used alternative observation rubrics (approximately one quarter of 
principals in the state) given that these districts did not report domain-
specific scores for principals. However, for principals for whom I could 
calculate factor scores, the average observation score and the factor score 
were correlated at 0.95 or higher each year.
18As part of a yearly statewide survey of educators in Tennessee, 
teachers are asked to provide Likert-scale responses to items that evalu-
ate principal performance. Examples of items include, “The principal 
at my school communicates a clear vision for this school” and “School 
leadership makes a sustained effort to address staff concerns.” To con-
struct a principal-by-year measure, I factor-analyzed the responses from 
teachers in each year, averaged the factor scores to the school-by-year 
level, and standardized the school averages within each year.
19Further, even teacher VA models that include both teacher and 
school effects typically yield a singular connected network because there 
are many teachers per school and relatively high mobility rates, which 
produces the variation to connect all of the schools in a state or district 
(e.g., Mansfield, 2015).
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